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Ohio's taxing system, like that of most states, is not really a system
at all but a hodgepodge of constitutional provisions and statutes resulting
from the demands for revenue and the pressures for exemption. For the
purist seeking some consistency in the structure, however, there is some
consolation in the almost universal tendency to relieve charities from
some of the tax burdens. The traditional reason for granting favorable
tax treatment to charitable organizations has been that their activities are
in a field which otherwise might have to be occupied by governmental
authority' but theories of what constitutes charity have varied from era
to era. For instance, in the 1600's, charity included the encouragement
-of "marriages of poor maids; supplication and help of young tradesmen,
handicraftsmen and persons decayed and ease of any poor inhabitants
,concerning payments of . . . taxes."' Ohio has never officially con-
sidered matrimonial efforts as charitable but the Ohio tax laws give
varying degrees of preference to charitable organizations, running the
:gamut from the real estate tax to the excise on beer and wine. The pur-
pose of this article is to show the present status of charities under each of
Ohio's major taxes. The word "charities" has been used in its broadest
sense to include any trust, organization or group having charitable pur-
poses as defined in Section 368 of The Restatement of The Law of
Trusts: "Charitable purposes include: (a) The relief of poverty; (b) the
advancement of education; (c) the advancement of religion; (d) pro-
motion of health; (e) governmental or municipal purposes; (f) other
purposes the accomplishment of which is beneficial to the community."
REAL PROPERTY TAx
As the oldest revenue device of local government, the real estate
tax hasproduced the largest body of case law relating to charitable organ-
izations. Before examining the substantive law, however, the exemption
procedure should be noted. Under the present law, the sole authority for
-exempting the real property of charities rests with The Board of Tax
Appeals.3 Application is made on exemption forms provided by the county
auditor who transmits the application to The Board of Tax Appeals. On
'the evidence presented with the application or after a hearing, the Board
grants or denies the exemption and this decision is appealable by the
OAssistant Trust Officer, The Huntington National Bank of Columbus,
Columbus, Ohio.
lKendrick v. Farquhar, 8 Ohio 189 (1837). Heisel, Exemption from Taxa-
.tion of Property Used for Religious, Educational, and Charitable Purposes In
Ohio, 3 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI L. R. 40 (1929).
2 Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz., c. 4 (1601).
3Ohio Rev. Code §5703.02.
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charity, the county auditor or any other party to either the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court.4
In deciding real estate exemption cases, the Board and the courts
have a line of precedents going back to the original Ohio Constitution.
The Ohio Constitution of 1802 placed few restrictions on the legislature
in the levying of real estate taxes or in the exempting of property from
the tax. Article VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution was a very general
expression to the effect that schools and the means of education should be
forever encouraged. There was also a prohibition against the levying of
poll taxes and a requirement of equal protection; except for these limita-
tions, the legislature had a free hand in determining objects of taxation
and exemption. Apparently, the legislature was thought to have abused
the privileges granted to it under the Constitution of 1802,' because in
the 1851 Constitution severe limitations were placed upon the taxing
authority of the legislature. Article XII, Section 2, of the new Con-
stitution read as follows:
Laws shall be passed, taxing by a uniform rule, all moneys,
credits, investments in bonds, stocks, joint stock companies, or
otherwise; also all real and personal property, according to its
true value in money, but burying grounds, public schoolhouses,
houses used exclusively for public worship, institutions of purely
public charity, public property used exclusively for any public
purpose and personal property, to an amount not exceeding in
value Two Hundred Dollars for each individual, may, by gen-
eral laws, be exempted from taxation; ...
This made property the sole basis of taxation, required that taxes be
assessed on all property except that specifically exempted, and further
required that taxes be assessed on a uniform rule according to true
value in money.6 In 1912 an amendment was made changing the phrase
"institutions of purely public charity" to "institutions used exclusively for
charitable purposes" but except for this amendment, no substantial change
was made from 1851 until the so-called classification amendment was
adopted in 1929. The stated object of the 1929 amendment was to pro-
vide a more flexible system of taxation for the State.7 Article XII,
Section 2, was amended to provide for classification of property and
to give the legislature broad discretion in the taxation of personal property,
both tangible and intangible. After providing that certain bonds were to
be exempt from taxation, the amended section read as follows:
• . .and without limiting the general power, subject to the
provisions of article I of this constitution, to determine the
subject and method of taxation or exemptions therefrom, gen-
eral laws may be passed to exempt burying grounds, public
4 Ohio Rev. Code §5717.04.
5 Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 1, 12 (1853).6 d. at p. 11.
7 House Joint Resolution No. 8, 88th General Assembly.
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school houses, houses used exclusively for public worship, in-
stitutions used exclusively for charitable purposes, and public
property used exclusively for any public purpose . . .
There has been speculation that by the adoption of this amendment the
power of the legislature to determine the taxability and the exemption of
various types of property is now back to the status that it was under the
original Constitution of 1802.8 The Ohio Supreme Court, however,
does not agree that the 1929 amendment gave the legislature broad
powers to exempt real property from taxation. The present law is stated
in the syllabus of Zangerle v. Cleveland as follows:9
2. The power of the General Assembly to exempt real property
from taxation is limited to the kind and classes enumerated in
Section 2, Article XII, of the Constitution.
3. The power of the General Assembly to determine the
subject and methods of taxation and exemption of personal
property is limited only by Article I of the Constitution. (State,
ex rel, Struble, v. Davis et al Tax Comm., 132 Ohio St., 555
approved and followed.)
Exercising its constitutional authority, the legislature has enacted the
following statutes:
Section 5709.01:
All real property in this State is subject to taxation except only
as is expressly exempted therefrom
Section 5709.12:
• . . real and tangible personal property belonging to institu-
tions that is used exclusively for charitable purposes shall be
exempted from taxation.
Section 5709.07:
Public schoolhouses and houses used exclusively for public wor-
ship, the books and furniture therein and the ground attached
to such 'buildings necessary for the proper occupancy, use and
enjoyment thereof and not leased or otherwise used with a
view to profit . . . shall be exempted from taxation . . .
In applying these statutory provisions within the limitations of the Ohio
Constitution, the courts have been faced with two main problems: (1)
Whether the activities of a particular organization are of such a nature
and benefit a large enough group to be considered "charitable" (2)
whether an institution carrying on activities which are concededly chari-
table in nature is using a particular parcel of property "exclusively" for
charitable purposes. Since the real estate tax exemption depends upon the
two-fold test of exclusive charitable use, it is not surprising that in some
instances it is diflicult to determine whether exemption was denied bc-
cause the property owner was not engaged in activities which would be
8 Caren, Constitutional Limitations on the Exemption of Real Property from
Taxation, 11 OHIO ST. L. J. 207, 210, 213 (1950).
9145 Ohio St. 347 (1945).
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classed as charitable, or whether the activities were charitable, but not
exclusively so.
One consideration in determining whether an institution is engaged
in charitable activities is whether it is paid for its services. In one early
case, O'Brien v. Physicians' Hospital Association,'0 the Supreme Court
stated that where a hospital was organized and operating as a charity,
it would not cease to be a charitable organization merely by accepting
payment from patients who were financially able to pay. In a later case,"
the Court was faced with a fact situation involving a hospital not for
profit which was, however, a private corporation. A number of doctors
received a salary from the hospital, but their services were billed and
paid through the hospital. The hospital showed a large net income after
payment of expenses and in a four to three decision the Court said that
the real property of the hospital was not exempt from taxation. In a
1945 case12 exemption had been sought for a playground adjacent and
belonging to a private school. Tuition to the school was determined ac-
cording to the financial means of the child's family, but there was no
evidence that there were any students who paid no fees. The Court
placed some stress on the fact that the playground was open to the chil-
dren in the neighborhood, cited the O'Brien case regarding the compen-
sation received by the school and found that the playground was exempt
from the real property tax. Two years later the O'Brien case was dis-
tinguished by the Court when it decided Battelle Memorial Institute v.
Dunn.3 This case involved the real property belonging to Battelle Me-
morial Institute, a non-profit corporation organized under the will of
Gordon Battelle "for the purpose of education in connection with the
encouragement of creative and research work and the making of dis-
coveries and inventions in connection with the metallurgy of coal, iron,
steel, zinc and their allied industries." The evidence indicated that a
substantial part of the Institute's activity consisted of sponsored research
for which the Institute received compensation from the sponsoring com-
pany equal to the estimated cost of the research plus a percentage to cover
overhead and other expenses. The Court distinguished the O'Brien case
saying that in that instance it was the primary object of the hospital to
render charity to those unable to pay, and that the amounts received from
a number of pay patients were devoted to the primary and humanitarian
object for which the hospital was established, whereas Battelle's research
was primarily for the direct benefit of those for whom it was per-
formed.' 4 Another interesting case involving the receipt of compensation
10 96 Ohio St. 1, 116 N.E. 975 (1917).
11 Cleveland Osteopathic Hosp. v. Zangerle, 153 Ohio St. 222, 91 N.E. 2d 261
(1950).
12 College Preparatory School for Girls v. Evatt, 140 Ohio St. 114, 43 N.E.
2d 646 (1945).
13148 Ohio St. 53, 73 N.E. 2d 88 (1947).
14 Id. at 61.
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by an institution applying for real property tax exemption under the
charitable section of the statute is Beernun Foundation v. Board of Tax
Appeals."5 The Beerman Foundation was a non-profit corporation fur-
nishing low rent housing to disabled veterans of World War I. Apart-
ments were furnished to qualified veterans at rentals which were ad-
mittedly less than half of the rate for comparable privately-owned
apartments. The majority opinion of the Court states ". . . no living
quarters are furnished free to any of the veterans occupying these apart-
ments, and it is not claimed that the occupants are objects of charity". 1
Following this reasoning, five members of the Court found that the
real estate was not used exclusively for charitable purposes and exemption
was denied.
Another facet of the charitable exemption question involves institu-
tions whose charitable activities are not directed to the public generally,
but are limited to a specified group. Prior to 1912, Article XII, Section 2,
of the Ohio Constitution provided for exemption of the real estate of
"institutions of purely public charity". In that year, however, the phrase
was changed to "institutions used exclusively for charitable purposes
• . ." There is evidence that the purpose of this constitutional amend-
ment was to permit the legislature to exempt the property of charitable
institutions which were not purely public in nature.17 Curiously enough,
however, there are several cases decided after 1912 which seemingly
deny exemption -because the charitable activities of the institution involved
were limited to a specific group. For instance, in Bloch v. Board of
Tax Appeals,'8 a unanimous Supreme Court held that a building used
to house a denominational school engaged in the training of ministers
was not "used exclusively for a charitable purpose" and was therefore
not exempt from taxation where such a school was not open to the public
generally. The problem was finally brought into the open in 1949 when
the Supreme Court decided the Cleveland Bible College case. 9 The
facts involved were these: The Board of Tax Appeals had denied the
real estate tax exemption application by the Cleveland Bible College
after a hearing in which there was evidence that for admission to at least
some of the courses of the College it was necessary that the student be
a follower of the Christian religion. This requirement was at least one
of the reasons for which the Board denied the exemption. A bare ma-
jority of the Supreme Court concluded that the Board's decision was
15 152 Ohio St. 179, 87 N.E. 2d 474 (1949).
'BId. at 181.
172 Ohio Constitutional Convention 1912, p. 1880.
18 144 Ohio St. 414, 59 N.E. 2d 145 (1945). See also American Committee of
Rabbinical College of Telshe, Inc. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 148 Ohio St. 654,
76 N.E. 2d 719 (1947) ; Society of the Precious Blood v. Board of Tax Appeals,
149 Ohio St. 62, 77 N.E. 2d 459 (1948).
9 Cleveland Bible College v. Board of Tax Appeals, 151 Ohio St. 258,
85 N.E. 2d 284 (1949).
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unreasonable and unlawful and that it should therefore be reversed.
Two members of the majority based their decision on the fact that the
school was in reality open to the public generally and that there was a
misunderstanding as to the testimony regarding the admission of non-
Christian students. The other two majority members, however, con-
cluded that an institution used exclusively for the lawful advancement
of education or religion or both is a charitable institution and that under
the 1912 amendment of Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution and
the subsequent change in Section 5709.12 of the Revised Code, it was
no longer necessary that such an institution be open generally to the
public in order to have tax exemption of the property owned and used
by it exclusively for such purposes. This four to three division in the
Court on this particular question was further emphasized in the American
Committee of Rabbinical College of Telshe v. Board of Tax Appeals2"
where the Court reversed an earlier decision and held that where real
property was otherwise qualified for exemption, the fact that it was
owned by a charitable institution not open generally to the public would
not disqualify it for exemption.
As indicated earlier, mere ownership by a charitable institution will
not automatically exempt a parcel of land from the Ohio real estate tax
since the property itself must also be used exclusively for charitable pur-
poses. Obviously, this means that rental real estate owned by a charitable
organization is subject to taxation, even though the net rentals are used
for charity."' It is not so clear, however, what variations in property
use can exist without the land losing its exempt status. For instance,
when does real property acquired for exclusive charitable use become tax
exempt? Will incidental commercial activity result in the property being
taxed, and can the property be split vertically or horizontally to exempt
only the portion used exclusively for charitable purposes?
There are several cases which have denied exemption to vacant real
estate being held by charitable organizations intending to build on the
property at a later date.2 2 The same result was reached when con-
struction was in progress.2" However, where an old church building was
torn down and a new church erected within a reasonable time, the
Supreme Court held that there was no loss of the tax exemption while
the land was "vacant".24 What seems to be a deviation in this line of
cases, is found in Good Samaritan Hospital Association v. Glander.25
20156 Ohio St. 376, 102 N.E. 2d 589 (1951).
21 Benjamin Rose Institute v. Myers, 92 Ohio St. 252, 110 N.E. 924 (1915).
22 Ursuline Academy of Cleveland v. Board of Tax Appeals, 141 Ohio St.
563, 49 N.E. 2d 674 (1943); Orthodox Hebrew Board of Education v. Tax Com-
missioner, 155 Ohio St. 380, 98 N.E. 2d 834 (1951) ; Y.W.C.A. v. Spencer, 9 Ohio
C. C. (N.S.) 351 (1907).
23 Jones v. Conn, 116 Ohio St. 1, 155 N.E. 791 (1927).
24Application of Ohave Scholem Congregation, 156 Ohio St. 183, 101 N.E.
2d 767 (1951).
25 155 Ohio St. 507, 99 N.E. 2d 473 (1951).
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In this case, a hospital acquired a house and barn for remodeling into a
nurses' home. Though the repairs were not complete, and the buildings
were not in use on tax listing date, the Court exempted the property by
a 5 to 2 decision. Even more curious, in view of the usual rule that
exemption statutes are strictly construed against the taxpayers, 26 is the
statement by the majority of the Court that there was nothing in the
record to show that the property had been used for non-charitable pur-
poses during the repairs and hence it was exempt.
There have been a number of cases in which the Ohio Supreme
Court has had to decide whether a given set of facts constituted ex-
clusively charitable use of the particular property involved. The Court's
approach to these cases can be illustrated by a series of four decisions in-
volving printing plants owned by charities. Exemption was denied to the
realty of a religious printing organization where 10% of the employees
were engaged in commercial printing contracts which produced about
40% of the organization's profits." The Court logically concluded that
there was no exclusive charitable use of the property itself even though
the profits went to disabled ministers, widows, and orphans. In Gospel
Worker Society v. Evatt2 s the record showed no evidence of commercial
printing, but the Society did publish its own magazine for which it re-
ceived some subscription payments. A majority of the judges apparently
used this fact to deny exemption to the property belonging to the Society.
A different result was reached where the property involved was a printing
plant making only collection envelopes for the owner-church, and
charging only its cost, plus a reserve against rising costs. Under these
circumstances the property was held to be tax exempt.29 This latter case
was based on an earlier case, American Issue Publishing Company v.
Evatt,3 which granted tax exemption to the property of a non-profit cor-
poration whose only activity was publishing temperance literature for the
national organization which owned all of its stock.
A slightly different approach to the problem of exclusive charitable
use was attempted in Welfare Foundation v. Glander3 ' where charitable
organizations occupied all but two floors of an eleven-story building
owned by one of the organizations. The lower two floors were rented
to commercial enterprises, but the owner, Welfare Foundation, con-
tended that the property could be split horizontally and the upper floors,
which were devoted exclusively to charitable purposes, exempted from
taxation. The Supreme Court, however, concluded that there was no
authority for such split listing and that since the property was not used
exclusively for charitable purposes, it was subject to taxation. This
26 Battelle Memorial Institute v. Dunn, 148 Ohio St. 53, 73 N.E. 2d 88 (1947).
2 7 Zindorf v. Otterbein Press, 138 Ohio St. 287, 34. N.E. 2d 748 (1941).
28 140 Ohio St. 185, 42 N.E. 2d 900 (1942).
29 Hubbard Press v. Glander, 156 Ohio St. 170, 101 N.E. 2d 382 (1951).
30137 Ohio St. 264, 28 N.E. 2d 613 (1940).
31 146 Ohio St. 146, 64 N.E. 2d 813 (1945).
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eventually resulted in the amendment of Section 5713.04 of the Revised
Code to its present form which reads as follows:
. . . If a separate parcel of improved or unimproved real
property has a single ownership, and is so used so that part
thereof, if a separate entity, would be exempt from taxation,
and the balance thereof would not be exempt from taxation,
the listing thereof shall be split, and the part thereof used
exclusively for an exempt purpose shall be regarded as a
separate entity and be listed as exempt, and the balance thereof
used for a purpose not exempt, shall, with the approaches
thereto, be listed at its true value in money and taxed
accordingly ...
This section of the statute was considered in 1952 by the Supreme Court
in Gokiman, a taxpayer, v. L. B. Harrison,32 in a case in which The
Board of Tax Appeals had found that 45% of the property involved
was not used exclusively for charitable purposes. A majority of the
Court, however, found that the section did not authorize the division of
real property on a percentage basis, and that therefore the entire property
involved was subject to taxation. In 1953 the Court concluded that the
section authorizing split-listing would apply to a building which could
be split according to floors3 and finally in 1954 the Welfare Foundation
itself was found to be exempt as to the floors involved in the earlier
case.
3 4
Until the year 1952 the exemption of real property belonging to
charitable organizations seemed to follow a fairly consistent pattern
based upon the standard of exclusive use of the property for charitable
purposes. In that year, however, the Supreme Court decided a group of
seven cases which seem to represent a change in approach even though
the Court is apparently applying the same standard as before. All of the
cases were instituted by the filing of a complaint by a Hamilton County
taxpayer regarding certain real estate located in that county. The owners
of all of the parcels of real estate were conceded by all parties to be
charitable organizations, such as the Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. All of
the organizations had an over-all program of a charitable nature, and
all of them devoted sections of the buildings for dormitories, public
cafeterias, restaurants and in some instances, bowling alleys, from which
they received revenue to be used for the general charitable purposes of
the organization. The Board of Tax Appeals found in each case that
the building was not used exclusively for charitable purposes and further
32 158 Ohio St. 181, 107 N.E. 2d 530 (1952).
33 Church of God v. Board of Tax Appeals, 159 Ohio St. 517, 112 N.E. 2d
633 (1953).
34 Welfare Foundation v. Peck, 160 Ohio St. 509, 117 N.E. 2d 1 (1954).
35 Goldman, A Taxpayer v. Y.M.C.A., 158 Ohio St. 185, 107 N.E. 2d 518
(1952).
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found that it was impossible to split the listing by metes and bounds.
The Board did attempt to make a percentage splitting of the building
and to exclude from taxation that portion of the property used ex-
clusively for charitable purposes. In the statement of the case by the
Supreme Court, it is noted that most of the properties had never been
taxed in earlier years. The Court reviewed many of the cases discussed
previously in this article, and concluded that there was no need for a
percentage split listing since the entire property was exempt. The
syllabus of the case reads as follows:
Real property is used exclusively for charitable purposes and
is exempt from taxation under Section 5353, General Code,
(5709.12 Ohio Rev. Code) where it is owned and operated
without profit by a charitable institution and by it devoted,
as its main objective, to an overall program of social, religious
and educational service to persons in peculiar need thereof,
without distinction as to race, color or creed, even though as
incidental to such objective, dormitory, dining room and other
like services are furnished and a charge made therefor, the
income therefrom being devoted to such program.
Judge Mathias wrote a short dissenting opinion in which he stated:
"The decision in these cases ignores the long established precedent and
adopts a new standard which is in itself vague, varying and uncertain.
s ..Those claiming exemption need no longer show that the property
is 'used exclusively for charitable purposes,' but only that such is its
main objective." 6 Whether, as Judge Mathias has pointed out, a new
exemption test has been created and whether it will have the effect of
placing more property on the exempt duplicate, certainly has not yet
been finally determined. It does seem fair to state however, that the
Board of Tax Appeals is now faced with administering a less definite
standard for exemption than existed prior to the decision of the
Y.M.C.A. cases.
Up to this point we have treated churches as a part of a general
group of charitable organizations. The Ohio Revised Code, however.
provides for the exemption of their real estate under a separate section,
5709.07, which reads in part as follows:
. . . Houses used exclusively for public worship, the books
and furniture therein, and the ground attached to such build-
ings necessary for the proper occupancy, use and enjoyment
thereof, and not leased or otherwise used with a view to
profit ... shall be exempt from taxation.
The wording of the statute raises at least two special problems in
the exemption of real estate belonging to churches. The first is whether
there can be a split-listing of a building where part of it is used for
non-religious purposes, such as a caretaker's apartment, and the second
36 Id. at 203, 204.
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is determining the extent to which grounds attached to a church are
necessary for its proper occupancy, use and enjoyment.
In Mussio v. Glander37 a three-story building had a ground floor
used for church services and the second and third floors used for priests'
and nuns' residences and the charitable work of the sisters. The Supreme
Court found that the property was not used exclusively either as a church
or for charitable purposes and that, therefore, it was subject to taxation.
The Court further found that because there was no statutory authority
at that time to split the listing of the property, it had to be considered as
one parcel. In Church of God v. The Board of Tax Appeals3s which
we have discussed earlier, the Court in a similar situation permitted a
split-listing and exempted the portion of the building used exclusively
for church purposes. In that case, the dissent contended that under the
Ohio Constitution and the statute, only houses used exclusively for
public worship are exempt from taxation and that therefore there is no
authority to split the property where the exemption is sought under what
is now Section 5709.07 relating to church property.
There have been a number of cases considering when the property
attached to the church building proper is necessary for its proper oc-
cupancy use and enjoyment. Residences of the priest, minister or rabbi
have been held subject to tax even though they adjoin the church prop-
erty." In 1941 the Supreme Court found that a church parking lot
owned by one church but used by another was convenient but not
necessary for the use and occupancy of the owner-church and therefore
was subject to taxation.4' This case may be considered unusual in that
the use and the ownership of the lot were in separate churches and also
it was before the parking problem became as acute as it is at present
time. In fact, the Board of Tax Appeals' records now indicate that
church parking lots may be exempt where the facts seem to indicate
that they are necessary to the use of the church building itself.
It is interesting to note the relationship of exempt property to
taxable property throughout the state. On the assessed valuation of real
property for 1955 tax duplicate, the total valuation of both taxable and
exempt property was approximately sixteen billion dollars; of this amount,
the total exempt property, including property owned by the United States,
the State of Ohio, and the various political subdivisions as well as the
property owned by charitable institutions was in excess of two billion
dollars. As a percentage of the total property the exempt real estate
amounted to 13.06%. Of this amount, about six hundred million dollars
was represented by the assessed value of the property of privately-owned
schools, colleges, charitiable institutions, and churches. This means that
37 149 Ohio St. 423, 79 N.E. 2d 233 (1948).
38 See supra, note 33.
39 Gerke v. Purcell, 25 Ohio St. 229 (1874) ; Watterson v. Halliday, 77 Ohio
St. 150, 82 N.E. 962 (1907).
40 Congregational Union v. Zangerle, 138 Ohio St. 246, 34 N.E. 2d 201 (1941).
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3.6% of the total assessed value of the real property in Ohio is owned
by the charitable institutions that we have been discussing in this section. 4
Obviously, these figures are nothing more than approximations since the
assessed value of property in Ohio is not truly representative of the
market value. Furthermore, any attempt to value some of the special-
ized property of charitable institutions is almost impossible, and once
property is placed on the exempt list, little effort is made to revalue it on
later appraisals.
TANGIBLE AND INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES
The 1929 classification amendment to the Ohio Constitution re-
lieved the General Assembly of the obligation to tax all personal property
in Ohio. It also permitted the widest latitude in determining what types
of personal property were to be taxed and what exemptions were to be
granted. Realizing that the traditional personal property tax on jewelry,
household goods and similar items produced many perjured pauper oaths.
but little revenue, the legislature chose to tax tangible personal property
only when it was used in business. With minor exceptions, this theony
is carried out by the following sections of the code:
Section 5709.01: . . . All personal property located and used
in business in this state, and all domestic animals kept in this
state, whether or not used in business, . . . are subject to
taxation, regardless of the residence of the owners thereof....
Section 5701.03: As used in Title LVII of the Revised Code,
'personal property' includes every tangible thing which is the
subject of ownership, whether animate or inanimate, other than
patterns, jigs, dies, or drawings, which are held for use and
not for sale in the ordinary course of business, money, and
motor vehicles registered by the owner thereof, and not form-
ing part of a parcel of real property as defined in Section
5701.02 of the Revised Code; ...
Section 5701.08: As used in Title LVII of the Revised Code:
(A) Personal property is 'used' within the meaning of 'used
in business' when employed or utilized in connection with
ordinary or special operations, when acquired or held as means
or instruments for carrying on the business, when kept and
maintained as a part of a plant capable of operation, whether
actually in operation or not, when stored or kept on hand as
material, parts, products or merchandise . . . (B) 'Business'
includes all enterprises conducted for gain, profit or income
and extends to personal service occupations.
It should 'be noted that under the Ohio tax laws, the term "personal
property" refers only to tangible property.
Even if the tangible personal property of a charity is used in busi-
41These figures were compiled from information supplied by the Division
of County Affairs of the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals.
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ness in such a way as to be considered taxable under the sections quoted
above, it may still be exempt from taxation under Section 5709.12:
".. . tangible personal property belonging to institutions that is used
exclusively for charitable purposes shall be exempt from taxation."
The effect of all these sections is to require two conditions to be met
before an Ohio charity's personal property is subject to taxation. First,
the property must be "used in business" as defined in the law and second,
the personalty must not be used exclusively for charitable purposes under
Section 5709.12. Since the burden of proof is normally on the taxing
authorities to show that property is subject to taxation and on the tax-
payer to show that property is entitled to exemption, it is possible to
conceive of some fine distinctiions of proof involved in such cases, but
in actual practice, there has been little litigation in this field. The
landmark decision is American Jersey Cattle Club v. Glander42 thle
syllabus of which reads as follows:
1. The fact, that a corporation is organized and operated as
one not for profit, does not mean that its enterprises may not
be conducted for gain, profit or net income to the corporation
as a legal entity apart from its members.
2. In determining whether the activities of a nonprofit corpo-
ration constitute enterprises conducted for gain, profit or net
income, it is proper to consider the history of such corporation.
3. The activities of such a corporation constitute enterprises
conducted for gain, profit or net income where it appears that.
(a) those activities have resulted in the accumulation by the
corporation over a period of years of substantial surplus funds,
(b) the corporation has had a substantial surplus of revenues
over expenditures from those activities during the preceding
year, and (c) the corporation admittedly regards such a sur-
plus as essential for expansion of its activities.
4. An organization's promotion of the use of a trade-mark in
sales by others of a competitive commercial product and its
furnishing of advertising matter to stimulate such sales are
activities which prevent such organization from being con-
sidered as one operated exclusively for charitable, scientific,
educational or public purposes.
The American Jersey Cattle Club was a non-profit corporation organized
for the purpose of improving breeding of Jersey cattle in the United
States. It maintained a written register for the cattle and conducted
activities to promote the breed. The dub also owned a trade-mark from
which it received royalties. The Tax Commissioner assessed the tangible
personal property belonging to the club pursuant to Rule No. 213 of
the Department of Taxation, the first paragraph of which read as
follows:
42 152 Ohio St. 506, 90 N.E. 2d 433 (1950).
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Tangible personal property of nonprofit organizations shall
be deemed 'used in business' and, therefore, subject to tax,
when such property is used in connection with customary
activities of such organizations for the use and enjoyment of
which a special rate or charge is imposed, whether or not the
income so derived be accumulated or disbursed in connection
with the other activities of such organizations...
After reviewing the operations of the club, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the Tax Commissioner's rule was not inconsistent with any
provision of law, and that the property was used in business within the
meaning of the statute. The Court further found that since the dub
was being operated in part for the purpose of encouraging the expansion
of markets of Jersey milk, it was not operated "exclusively" for chari-
table, scientific, educational or public purposes and therefore the property
was not exempt. Where, however, the commercial aspects of the trade-
mark promotion are absent and where the primary function of an
organization seems to be education and promotion of arts and sciences,
even though limited to a particular field, tangible personal property be-
longing to the organization may be exempt from taxation.
In Lutheran Bookshop v. Bowers" a nonprofit corporation owned
a bookshop near downtown Toledo, selling Bibles, literature, books,
greeting cards, stationery and religious materials for the use of churches,
Sunday schools and the general public. The shop advertised in the news-
papers, radio and other media and all sales were made above cost. On
these facts, the Supreme Court found the personal property owned by
the shop was used in business and subject to taxation. It further found
that it was not used exclusively for charitable purposes and hence was
not exempt under Section 5709.12.
There are three courses that a charitable organization may follow
in returning its tangible personal property for taxation. (1) It may
make no return of the property at all on the assumption that it is not
used in business. If the Tax Commissioner later determines that the
property is used in business and it is not used exclusively for charitable
purposes, the organization may be subject to penalties.4 5 (2) File blank
returns showing no property used in business and force the Tax Com-
missioner to make a determination. (3) File an application in the
Board of Tax Appeals for exemption of the property as used exclusively
for charitable purposes. In theory, at least, the third alternative might
be considered as an admission that the property was used in business
and therefore primea facie subject to taxation.
Turning to intangible personal property, we find that it is subject
43 In re American Ceramic Society, Inc., Board of Tax Appeals, October 13,
1952.
44164 Ohio St. 359 (1955).
45 Ohio Rev. Code §5711.27.
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to taxation in Ohio, whether it is used in business or not. Section 5709.02
provides: "All money, credits, investments, deposits and other intangible
property of persons residing in this state shall be subject to taxation,
except as provided in this section or as otherwise provided or exempted in
Title LVII of the Revised Code: . . ." This means that securities
belonging to a charity would be taxed except for Section 5709.04:
"Money, credits, investments, deposits and other intangible property
belonging, either legally or beneficially, to corporations, trust associations,
funds, foundations, or community chests, organized and operated ex-
clusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, health, hospital,
educational, or public purposes, exclusively for the prevention of cruelty
to children or animals, or exclusively for contributing financial support
for any such purposes, no part of the net earnings of which insures
(inures) to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, and no
substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda or
otherwise attempting to influence legislation, shall not be subject to taxa-
tion." This section provides a liberal exemption for intangible personal
property belonging to charitable organizations and is a direct copy of the
federal statutes providing for exemption from federal income, estate
and gift taxes.46 Prior to the adoption of Section 5709.04 in 1945,
the Ohio Supreme Court had ruled that the investments belonging to
a charitable organization were subject to taxation. 47 When the statute
was originally enacted, the Board of Tax Appeals held that it had origi-
nal jurisdiction to exempt intangible personal property from taxation. 48
Later the Board expressly overruled this decision and concluded, perhaps
not unmindful of the thousands of applications for exemption, that the
section was not an exemption statute but merely defined when certain
property was subject to taxation and was, therefore, within the juris-
diction of the Tax Commissioner.
49
In view of the statutory language of Section 5709.04 referring
to property belonging "either legally or beneficially" to charitable organ-
izations, it would seem that investments in the hands of an executor for
ultimate distribution to the charity, should be excluded from taxation.
This question was raised during the period when the Board of Tax
Appeals was considered to have the exclusive jurisdiction for exempting
intangible property."0 In a very brief opinion the Board found that to
46 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §§501 (c), 170(c), (income tax); 2055(a)
(estate tax); 2522 (a) (b) (gift tax). These sections were taken, with minor
changes, from the Revenue Code of 1939.
4 7 The Wehrle Foundation v. Evatt, 141 Ohio St. 467, 49 N.E. 2d 52 (1943).
4 8 1n re Cleveland Memorial Medical Foundation, 54 Ohio L. Abs. 88,
83 N.E. 2d 829 (1948).
49In re Battelle Memorial Institute, 60 Ohio L. Abs. 405, 99 N.E. 2d 99
(1951).
I01n re Application of Estate of Charles H. Woodward, Board of Tax Ap-
peals No. 15579.
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the extent the intangible property held by the executor exceeded the
amount of the debts and claims payable out of the estate, it was exempt
from taxation if the intangibles would eventually pass to an exempt
organization.
INHERITANCE TAX
The Ohio Inheritance Tax is in the nature of an excise tax on the
right to receive property of a decedent 5' or, in the case of the additional
tax levied to take advantage of the 80% credit under the Federal Estate
Tax,52 the right to transmit property from the estate." The present
inheritance tax law was enacted in 1919 and follows the pattern per-
mitted by Article XII, Section 7 of The Ohio Constitution, levying a
tax at increasing rates on larger inheritances and those from distant re-
latives or strangers. The exemption of successions of property to certain
types of charities is provided in Section 5731.09 ofthe Revised Code:
The succession to any property passing to or for the use of
• . . any public institution of learning or any public hospital
not for profit, within this state, or any institution of learning
or any public hospital not for profit within any state of the
United States, which state does not impose an inheritance,
estate, or transfer tax on property given, devised, or bequeathed
by a resident thereof to an institution of learning, or any public
hospital not for profit, within this state, or to or for the use of
an institution for purposes only of public charity, carried on in
whole or in a substantial part within this state, or to an in-
stitution or organization not for profit whose exclusive purpose
is printing and distributing the Bible, shall not be subject to
Section 5731.02 of the Revised Code . . .
Several facts are apparent from reading the statute: successions
from an Ohio decedent may be taxable if they pass to a charity located
or incorporated in a state which does not provide for reciprocal exemp-
tion of gifts to an Ohio charity; an Ohio institution of learning must
be "public" to receive a tax-free inheritance but a similar body in a
reciprocal state need not be "public". Some other facets have been de-
veloped by court decisions.
Considering the exemption for gifts to institutions of learning, it
has been held that the mere publishing of books is not operating an edu-
cational institution. 4 Also, where the educational work of an organization
is subsidiary to its religious and missionary endeavors, exemption will be
denied.5 Where there is an actual school offering seminary and pre-
seminary training, open to all persons meeting certain entrance standards,
5' State ex rel. Taylor v. Guilbert 70 Ohio St. 229 (1904).
52 Ohio Rev. Code §5731.13.
sa 1932 Ohio Atty. Gen. Ops. No. 4551.
5 4 In re Estate of Taylor, 139 Ohio St. 417, 40 N.E. 2d 936 (1942).
5 5 1n re Estate of Osborn, 159 Ohio St. 63, 110 N.E. 2d 791 (1953).
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gifts to the school will be exempt even though it is not publicly main-
tained. 0 Where the bequest to the institution limits its benefits to a
certain group of students, such as those in the theological school, it may
still qualify for exemption.
5 7
Two problems arise in interpreting the portion of Section 5731.09
relating to institutions for purposes only of public charity: (1) what
institutions fall within this class and (2) when are their activities "carried
on in whole or in a substantial part" in Ohio? Answering the second
question, the courts have found that where one-forty-eighth of the
American Humane Educational Society's expenditures were in Ohio,
it was a substantial part."8 In In re Estate of Oglebay, 9 the trustees
could spend no more than fifty percent of the income and principal of
a trust for public charity in West Virginia and the remainder was to be
used for public charitable purposes in Ohio. The Department of Taxa-
tion contended that the tax should apply to the one half that might be
expended out of the state. The Supreme Court held that the bequest
to the trustees was a single succession and was exempt from tax because
a substantial part was required to be spent in Ohio.
The Department of Taxation has considered gifts to many organ-
izations exempt for purposes only of public charity, including the
Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A., Red Cross, Community Chest, orphanages,
homes for the aged, historical societies and art museums. However,
the Department, attorneys and text writers0 0 have stated unequivocally
that general religious gifts are not exempt, even though there has been
no direct statement by the Supreme Court on such a gift. The most
definitive statements until recently were that exemption as an institution
of learning was precluded where religious activities dominated educa-
tional endeavors 1 and that a bequest for the saying of masses for the
repose of the soul of a decedent was subject to taxation. 2 There are a
number of lower court decisions taxing gifts for religious or combined
religious and charitable purposes, including a gift to the Salvation
Army. On December 19, 1956 the Supreme Court decided In re Estate
of Seanman, 4 the syllabus of which reads:
1. Charitable purposes include religious purposes.
2. An institution organized and conducted for charitable pur-
poses is an institution for purposes of public charity if its
501n re Estate of Lambert, 69 Ohio App. 522, 44 N.E. 2d 325 (1940).
57 In re Estate of Whiting, 34 Ohio Abs. 207, 21 Ohio Op. 55 (1938).
5 8 Tax Commissioner v. American Humane Society, 42 Ohio App. 4, 181
N.E. 557 (1931).
59 162 Ohio St. 1, 110 N.E. 2d 792 (1954).
60 DEIBEL, Orno PROBATE LAW 578 (5th ed. 1954).
61 Note 55, supra.
021n re Estate of Shanrahan, 159 Ohio St. 487, 112 N.E. 2d 665 (1953).
63In re Estate of Weld, 71 Ohio App. 497, 50 N.E. 2d 275 (1942).
64 In re Estate of Seaman, 166 Ohio St. 51, 139 N.E. 2d 17 (1956).
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benefits are open and available to the public generally.
3. If the benefits of an institution organized and conducted
for religious and other charitable purposes only are open and
available to the public generally, such institution is an institu-
tion for purposes only of public charity within the meaning of
those words as used in Section 5334, General Code (Section
5731.09, Revised Code).
Thus, four members of the Court held that a 'bequest to the Salvation
Army was exempt from inheritance tax. Two judges joined Judge
Zimmerman in a dissenting opinion in which they hinted that the ma-
jority might be accused of "judicial legislation".65 Based on the Seaman
case, the Department of Taxation seems bound to exempt gifts to
organizations engaged solely in religious and charitable activities for the
general public -but the question of exemption of a purely religious bequest
apparently remains to be litigated in the Supreme Court.
Estate planners should consider several other aspects of charitable
gifts under the inheritance tax. Gifts to non-charitable organizations
may be tax-exempt if the use of the gift is restricted to exempt purposes 6
and conversely, gifts to a charity giving discretionary powers to apply
the property to private persons or to out-of-state activities may be tax-
able.6" Also, a bequest limiting the benefits to a small group may be
considered too narrow to be public charity.68 Section 5731.06 exempts
the proceeds of life insurance payable on the insured's death unless paid
to the insured's estate. By making a church or other non-exempt in-
stitution the beneficiary of his life insurance a decedent can transfer this
property free of inheritance tax.
SALES AND UsE TAx
A depression baby that grew to a multi-million dollar maturity, the
Ohio sales and use tax is now the primary source of revenue for the state
government. The tax is on the retail sale of tangible personal property
to the consumer and is at a three percent rate collected on a bracket
system. The law excludes several types of transactions from the defini-
tion of "retail sale" 69 and exempts eighteen kinds of retail sales from
the tax.7" The only exclusion of direct interest to charities relates to
sales for resale. 7 No tax applies to any sale the purpose of which is to
65 d. at 62.
661n re Estate of White, 23 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 574 (1922).
67 Tax Comm. v. Paxson, 118 Ohio St. 36, 160 N.E. 468 (1928). In re Estate
of Bremer, 166 Ohio St. 233 (1957).
68Tax Commissioner v. Bank and Trust Co., 117 Ohio St. 443, 159 N.E. 570
(1927).
69 Ohio Rev. Code §5739.01. 1
7°Ohio Rev. Code §5739.01(B).
71 Ohio Rev. Code §5739.01 (E) (1).
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resell the article in the same form as received. The exemptions applica-
ble to charitable organizations are in Subsection B of Section 5739.02
. . . (10) casual or isolated sales by a vendor not engaged in
the business of selling tangible personal property except as to
such sales of motor vehicles and house trailers; . . . (14)
sales of tangible personal property to charitable and religious
organizations; . . .
The casual sale exclusion points up the difference in treatment, for
sales tax purposes, of sales by charitable and religious organizations and
sales to them. Regardless of the purpose, sales to a charity are exempt
from tax. Where, however, churches, schools, foundations and similar
institutions regularly engage in selling tangible personal property, in-
cluding meals, such sales are taxable to the consumer and the organiza-
tion must apply for a vendor's license, collect the tax and remit it to the
State of Ohio. 72 The Attorney General has given an opinion that sales
of food and other articles by ladies aid societies and similar organizations
affiliated with churches are usually casual and isolated sales.7" The Tax
Commissioner has adopted Rule No. 57 in an attempt to draw an ad-
ministrative line between casual and non-casual sales; it reads: "Charita-
ble and religious organizations which sell tangible personal property in-
cluding meals, and conduct more than four such sales per year, are not
making casual or isolated sales within the meaning of the sales tax law
and must, therefore, obtain vendors' licenses and collect the sales tax
upon all sales." The Commissioner's Rule No. 58 requires all organ-
izations making non-casual sales to procure licenses, except public and
parochial schools serving cafeteria meals or selling school supplies not as
a business and without profit.
The exemption of sales to charitable and religious organizations is
administered under the above Rule No. 58 which requires ". . . the
dominant functions of the organization must be of a charitable or
religious character, and the income of the organization must be devoted
to said activities and functions, and not inure to the benefit of any
private stockholder or individual." In doubtful cases the Department
of Taxation will require the organization to submit a copy of its purpose
clause and a statement of recent receipts and disbursements.74 The Board
of Tax Appeals has exempted sales to the Oberlin College Alumni Asso-
ciation 7' but sales to Battelle Memorial Institute, the research organiza-
tion discussed earlier in the real estate tax section of this article, were
held to be taxable. 76 The Department of Taxation issues a list of exempt
721938 Ohio Atty. Gen. Ops. No. 2368.
73 1936 Ohio Atty. Gen. Ops. No. 873.
74 Circular, Ohio Department of Taxation, June 1, 1953.
75 Oberlin College Alumni Association v. Peck, Ohio Board of Tax Appeals,
No. 26337, August 31, 1954.
76 Battelle Memorial Institute v. Glander, Ohio Board of Tax Appeals.
September 10, 1951.
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charities but there is no requirement for registration and the list is far
from complete. Any vendor who, in fact, makes a sale to any charitable
or religious organization may consider the sale exempt from tax but
presumably he would have the burden of proving the exemption upon
audit.1
7
Construction contracts under which a contractor builds or repairs a
building for a church or charity present a unique sales tax problem.
Under the law, where the contract price is stated as lump sum covering
both labor and materials, the contractor makes no "sale" for the lump
sum but is considered the consumer of the materials, which are subject to
sales tax when purchased .7 If the contract or the billing breaks down
the items of material and labor, the contractor is considered to be selling
the materials and the owner bears the sales tax. Thus, if a religious or
charitable organization contracts for construction in a "break down"
contract all materials will be purchased free of sales tax but if the con-
tract is on a lump sum basis, the contractor will be subject to tax on the
items used.
7 9
Ohio charities receive not only the indirect benefit of tax exemption
but may also obtain the direct benefit of cash payments for helping the
state collect its taxes. No church group or women's club is complete
without a committee whose chairman exhorts the members to hoard the
stamps that evidence payment of the sales tax. Section 5741.08 of the
Revised Code provides that health, welfare, charitable, religious, edu-
cational, fraternal and patriotic organizations in existence on December
31, 1938, may present cancelled sales tax stamps for redemption at the
rate of three percent of the face value of the stamps redeemed. Other
organizations and private individuals may redeem stamps at the same rate
by presenting evidence that they have assisted the state in the collection of
the tax. The "evidence" is usually a statement that the persons collecting
the stamps have insisted that the vendors cancel them on all taxable sales.
Sales tax redemption has resulted in payments to Ohio organizations and
individuals amounting to almost $41 million from June 1939 to June
1956 and in recent years about 70 percent of the issued stamps have been
redeemed. 0
MINOR TAXES
Franchise Tax-All charities organized as corporations, either for profit
or non-profit, are subject to the Ohio Corporation Franchise Tax, unless
77 Leakas Furriers v. Bowers, 98 Ohio App. 337, 129 N.E. 2d 478 (1954).
78 Ornamental Iron Work Co. v. Peck, 160 Ohio St. 399, 116 N.E. 2d 577
(1953).
79 Joseph A. Clemente v. Glander, Ohio Board of Tax Appeals, No. 19211,
May 28, 1951; Wagner-Smith v. Glander, Ohio Board of Tax Appeals, No. 16165,
November 9, 1949.
SOBulletin, Ohio Department of Taxation, Division of Research and Sta-
tistics, July 20, 1956,
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under the jurisdiction of the Superintendent of Insurance.," The mini-
mum tax is twenty-five dollars per year.
8 2
Gasoline Taxes-No exemptions specially applicable to charities.
Cigarette Taxes-No exemptions specially applicable to charities.
Alcoholic Beverage Taxes-Wine for known sacramental purposes is
exempt from the wine tax levied by Section 4301.43 of the Revised Code.
Financial Institutions Taxes-The tax on the deposits of financial in-
stitutions exempts the deposit of an "institution used exclusively for
charitable purposes"'" but since this tax is customarily absorbed by the
banks it has no direct effect on charitable organizations.
CONCLUSION
Traditionally, a law review article ends with a ringing defense or
denunciation of the legal mechanism studied. Ohio's tax treatment of
charities is not susceptible to such a definite stand, if for no other reason
than lack of information. No one knows the effect of charitable exemp-
tions on the state, the charities or the private individual. Assuming the
correctness of the premise that charitable organizations are entitled to
favorable tax treatment because they perform functions that might other-
wise be a governmental responsibility, Ohio's tax laws seem to operate
fairly consistently. There is a tendency in the statutes and the adminis-
tration to limit exemptions to institutions clearly charitable in nature and
to deny tax favors where charities are in competition with business and
industry. Unless the basic premise is changed or there is a major study
of the economic effect of exemptions, no crusade for or against the
charities seems imminent.
81 Ohio Rev. Code §§5733.01 and 5733.09.
82 Ohio Rev. Code §5733.06.
83 Ohio Rev. Code §5725.03 (c).
19571
